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Abstract—Personal Voice Assistants (PVAs) such as the Siri,
Amazon Echo and Google Home are now commonplace. PVAs
continuously monitor conversations which may be transported to
a cloud back end where they are stored, processed and maybe
even passed on to other service providers. A user has little control
over this process. She is unable to control the recording behaviour
of surrounding PVAs, unable to signal her privacy requirements
to back-end systems and unable to track conversation recordings.
In this paper we explore techniques for embedding additional
information into acoustic signals processed by PVAs. A user
employs a tagging device which emits an acoustic signal when
PVA activity is assumed. Any active PVA will embed this tag into
their recorded audio stream. The tag may signal a cooperating
PVA or back-end system that a user has not given a recording
consent. The tag may also be used to trace when and where
a recording was taken. We discuss different tagging techniques
and application scenarios, and we describe the implementation
of a prototype tagging device based on PocketSphinx. Using the
popular PVA Google Home Mini we demonstrate that the device
can tag conversations and that the tagging signal can be retrieved
from conversations stored in the Google back-end system.
Index Terms—Smart Speakers; Personal Voice Assistants;
Virtual Assistants; Voice Controllable Systems; Signal Tagging;
Wake Word Detection; Acoustic Privacy; IoT Security and
Privacy;
I. INTRODUCTION
Siri, Amazon Echo, Google Home and the like are now
commonplace PVAs. They are integrated in mobile phones
(Siri, Cortana), consumer electronics such as TVs (SkyQ)
and are also used as stand-alone devices (Amazon Echo,
Google Home). PVAs are sometimes also referred to as Smart
Speakers or Voice Controllable System (VCS). PVAs contin-
uously monitor conversations and may transport conversation
elements to a cloud back end where speech is stored, processed
and maybe even passed on to other services.
A user has currently little control over how her conversa-
tions are treated. Not all PVAs are owned or managed by
the user, and she is normally not in control of back-end
systems and has no influence over how the services exchange
conversation recordings. For example, when meeting people
the user can switch off her own phone-based PVA but cannot
control PVAs of others.
We argue that users desire more control on how their
conversations are processed by PVAs. We propose to embed
additional information (referred to as tag) into acoustic signals
which can then be interpreted by the systems to implement
security and privacy requirements of involved parties.
Many methods to generate acoustic tags exist, ranging
from a simple signal overlay (e.g. addition of a single tone)
to a hidden acoustic watermark, which in turn are suitable
for different application scenarios. For example, a simple
acoustic tag can be employed by users to signal that they have
given no consent to recording, processing and distribution of
conversations recorded in their presence. A cooperating PVA
back end looking out for such tags may then not process the
recorded audio to honor the wishes of individuals. An acoustic
watermark hidden within a recorded audio sample may be
used by individuals to identify the origin of recorded speech
at a later stage; it might give individuals an opportunity to
keep track of recordings they have never agreed to. In such a
scenario, cooperation of the PVA back end is not necessary.
Besides the design of a tag and its usage, there is also the
question of how the acoustic tag is generated. A device is
needed to generate the tagging signal; a likely candidate is
a mobile phone with a suitable app. As it is not efficient
to continuously transmit tag information (and the tag signal
may also be perceived as noise nuisance if audible) it must be
determined when to emit a tag signal. This can be solved by
having a tagging device listening for the same wake words as
the PVA. Finally, as multiple users may want to tag, collisions
must be avoided and a tagging protocol must be established.
This paper explores the aforementioned design space of
acoustic tagging for PVAs. We consider options for tagging
devices, tagging signals and application scenarios. The specific
contributions of the paper are:
• Tagging Applications: We give a description of applica-
tion scenarios in which acoustic tagging can address user
privacy and security concerns.
• Tagging Signals an Protocols: We provide a classification
of tagging options and describe protocols for embedding
tags of multiple users.
• Tagging Evaluation: We provide an evaluation of the
signal path for simple overlay tagging using Google
Home Mini. We show that tagging signals in the range
between 4kHz and around 7.2kHz are usable.
• Tagging Prototype: We describe our prototype tagging


























Fig. 1: The workflow of a personal voice assistant, without or with
a tagging device.
the system. The prototype shows that tagging can be used
to signal non-consent in public spaces.
Section II describes PVA functionality. Section III discusses
tagging application scenarios. In Section IV we describe
different tagging options followed by a description of tagging
protocols in Section V. Section VI provides a tagging eval-
uation with Google Home Mini. Section VII describes our
prototype device and its evaluation. Section VIII discusses
related work and Section IX concludes the paper.
II. PERSONAL VOICE ASSISTANT (PVA)
The operation cycle of a PVA, shown in Figure 1, consists
of two phases: activation phase and recognition phase.
In the activation phase the PVA waits for a user to activate
voice recognition. A user may activate voice recognition by
specific actions such as a button press (e.g. as used on a Sky
Q remote) or by stating a specific wake word (e.g. Alexa in
case of Amazon’s Echo). In light of practicality, most systems
utilize a wake word mechanism. The wake words may be
speaker-dependent (trained to recognize a speaker) or speaker-
independent (any user can state the wake word) [2].
On activation the PVA enters the recognition phase. In most
scenarios, the PVAs streams the audio signals following the
wake word to a back end for analysis. Voice recognition
is carried out in the back end for several reasons: to keep
computation-intensive tasks away from the device; to enable
flexibility in updating voice recognition algorithms; to enable
flexibility in PVA services. The back end may take actions in
response to the processing result. A response might be sent to
the local device or another action may be triggered.
The captured audio streams are stored by PVA providers,
and the storage duration and the specific usage of the data is
not clearly articulated [3], [4], [5].
III. APPLICATION SCENARIOS
Acoustic tagging in the context of PVAs can be used for a
number of security and privacy related application scenarios.
The set of scenarios provided here covers a broad range of
possible scenarios but is not exhaustive. Acoustic tags may
carry rich semantic information.
A. Signalling Recording Consent
People generally object to conversations being recorded
without their given consent. Hence, laws exist in most coun-
tries defining (very differently) how recording consent has
to be given. For example, Germany is a two-party consent
state, which means that (phone call) recording without the
consent of participants is a criminal offense. In the U.K.,
the Data Protection Act (DPA) of 1998 assumes tacit con-
sent and individuals must be only given the option to opt
out from recordings. Recent European Union (EU) General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) legislation, superseding
the aforementioned situation in U.K. and Germany, requires
consent of all parties for a specific purpose. In the context of
PVAs it is a question of how participants can signal consent
or lack thereof. It is not always evident to people that there
are PVAs nearby that record conversations. In addition, PVAs
do not have an interface to provide consent information.
Acoustic signal tagging as we propose provides a technical
solution to implement PVA compliance with legislation. An
acoustic tag will be emitted by users who give no recording
consent. Any PVA system detecting a tag could then refrain
from processing or even recording a conversation. PVAs need
not introduce an additional interface to interact with users,
and all existing systems can use this mechanism by simply
augmenting their audio processing capabilities. Tag signals can
be emitted by simple user devices such as a smart phone. Tags
do not have to be transmitted such that they interfere with
users and their conversations. Tag transmission can be timed
such that they are only transmitted when required; a signal
strength and frequency will be chosen to minimize impact.
This solution obviously requires cooperating PVAs that react
to detected tag signals.
We describe and analyze an implementation of a tagging
system for consent signalling in Sections VI and VII.
B. Recording Identification
PVAs record conversations which are stored on back-end
systems. Recorded conversations are potentially stored for long
periods of time (years). Stored conversations can be accessed
by anyone that has access to the back end. Usually, access to
recordings is limited to PVA owners. However, it has to be
noted that PVA owners and conversation participants may be
different groups.
It is reasonable to assume that conversations are recorded
(by accident or on purpose) without consent by nearby PVAs.
Such recordings may later be used and it might be desirable
to identify the context (e.g. location, time, participants) of the
conversation.
An acoustic tag can be used to add the required meta
information to conversations. The tag might be added in a
way that it is hidden within the recorded audio signal in order
to prevent detection and/or removal of the signal. We discuss
tagging options and details in Section IV.
C. Data Trading
PVAs store conversation recordings on back-end systems.
This data is an asset and the service providers employ it
to improve their offerings. For example, stored conversation
recordings are used to improve voice recognition algorithms.
Significant improvements can be made by training voice
recognition algorithms using samples from a large number of
individuals.
PVA service providers may decide to trade conversation
samples, for example for algorithm training purposes. We are
not aware that any service providers currently engage in such
data exchange; however, common PVA license agreements
would allow the providers to engage in such activities [6].
A provider may tag samples in order to control further
distribution or to simply mark the sample source.
IV. TAGGING OPTIONS
There are a number of options for embedding additional
information in audio signals processed by PVAs. Generally, the
additional information must be embedded within the frequency
spectrum that is supported by the PVA microphone hardware,
the PVA processing software and the PVA back end. An
investigation of the usable spectrum for a typical device is
provided in Section VI. Within the usable frequency spectrum,
additional information can be embedded in different ways
enabling a variety of application scenarios.
The amount of information that can be included using a tag
depends on how obvious (audible) the tag can be (frequency
range, power, encoding mechanism) and how much noise the
PVA processing environment will add.
We identified four classes of tags, differing in their suitabil-
ity for scenarios and implementation complexity:
Audible Tag: A tag is embedded and its presence is
clearly audible, e.g. in the form of audible noise. People will
notice that noise during their conversation, making it obvious
to everyone that something has happened. The information
might be placed in a frequency space that is normally not
occupied by voice. This simplifies the separation of voice and
tag. It will be clear to anyone listening to the recorded sound
that a tag is embedded; a spectrum analyzer will also clearly
reveal the tag. As the tag can be clearly identified it can also
later be removed.
An audible tag can be generated easily. A speaker can be
used to generate the tag, which will be overlaid on a monitored
conversation.
Unnoticeable Tag: The tag is added to the audio sig-
nal such that its presence is not noticeable to a human.
For example, the tag signal power might be small com-
pared to the present voice signal power or the combina-
tion of power/frequency of the tag signal in relation to the
power/frequency of the voice signal is such that users do not
notice the tag. Embedding of the tag information will not
disrupt users. Listening to the recorded audio will not reveal
a tag. However, investigation of the signal using a spectrum
analyzer may still reveal the tag. In addition, it would also be
possible to remove later a tag from a recording.
An unnoticeable tag may be included using spread spectrum
techniques, where narrow-band tag information is transmitted
over a large bandwidth, such that the signal energy added at
each frequency leads to a non-audible change.
More challenging techniques may analyze the audio stream
on the fly and then add information selectively which do not
lead to noticeable audio changes. For example, properties of
the human hearing can be exploited to place unnoticeable
information. Audio compression algorithms such as MP3 [7]
use similar mechanisms to decide which data to remove from
a signal. In the same way such insight can be used to add
information to a signal.
Inaudible Tag: This approach is similar to the unnotice-
able tag. The tag is added to the audio signal such that it
cannot be perceived by a human. For example, the tag might
be placed in a frequency range above 22kHz. However, when
analyzing the signal in a spectrum analyzer, the additional
tag signal will clearly be visible and could therefore also be
removed later.
An inaudible tag is useful for similar applications as the
unnoticeable tag. However, as the information does not have
to be woven into the conversation, implementation is relatively
straight forward. In particular, recovery of the signal is simpli-
fied, a simple filter can be used to extract the tag signal. Whilst
this approach is preferable to the aforementioned unnoticeable
tag, limitations on the usable frequency space may prevent this
method in the context of specific PVAs.
Hidden Tag: The tag is added to the audio signal such
that it cannot be perceived by the user. In addition, it cannot be
determined by other tools (e.g. spectrum analyzer, frequency
analysis) that a tag is embedded in the signal. The only way to
identify a present tag is to compare the original tag-free signal
with the tagged one. In this case the tag could be considered
an acoustic watermark.
A hidden tag has similar processing requirements as the
unnoticeable tag. However, in addition the data has to be
placed in such a way that it cannot be recovered by analyzing
the recording. Using a cryptographic key, data has to be
integrated with the conversation. In this case the tag should
also be robust against transformations (e.g. downsampling,
transcoding).
For example, a Spectrum Audio Watermarking (SSW) can
be used where the tag information is distributed over a large
frequency spectrum. A pseudonoise (PN) sequence is used to
spread the tag information over the frequency space; to recover
the tag from the signal the PN sequence must be known.
SSW is difficult to remove; a wideband noise signal of high
amplitude is required which is very noticeable.
V. TAGGING PROTOCOLS
In many situations more than one tagging device might be
present and a protocol is necessary to ensure that tag signals
are added orderly such that tag recovery is possible.
The tagging of an acoustic signal must be timed as it is
not feasible to emit a continuous tagging signal. A continuous






























































Fig. 2: The spectrograms of the audio signals, including (a) the original audio signal of “Hey Google, when is your birthday”, (b) the man-
made multi-tone tag signal, (c) the recording of the original audio signal together with the tag signal downloaded from the Google server,
and (d) the same signal considering no loss and distortion during the whole process of propagation, recording, uploading and compression
inefficient; e.g. it will drain the battery of the tagging device. A
tagging device will become active when needed, for example,
when detecting a wake word. Thus, all tagging devices are
likely to emit the tagging signal at the same time leading to
collisions. Collisions may prevent recovery of the tag signals.
Devices may separate their tag signals in frequency, time
or code domain to prevent collision. Alternatively some
devices may refrain from tagging to ensure that only one
device embeds a clear tag. As each device must determine
frequency/time/code, coordination among tagging devices is
necessary. This can be achieved by using an out-of-band
control channel among devices (e.g. a local wireless link) or
by using in-band methods as used in Medium Access Control
(MAC) protocols for wireless communications. For example,
tagging devices might listen first if a tagging signal is already
present, if so, a free frequency/code is chosen or the device
delays tagging.
In-band coordination requires that tagging devices are aware
of other tagging signals. Obviously, the tagging option used
must allow devices to observe this process. When using hidden
tags, in-band coordination might therefore not be feasible
unless all devices are able to recover the hidden information.
The required coordination might also depend on the applica-
tion scenario. If it is only necessary to determine a tag presence
but decoding of information is not necessary, collisions are not
an issue. For example, multiple devices could express that they
do not consent to a recording with colliding signals; the PVA
back end only needs to determine signal presence but does not
necessarily have to decode information carried in the tag.
VI. TAGGING ANALYSIS
We use a common PVA, the Google Home Mini, to evaluate
tagging performance. The aim is to determine the usable
tagging frequency range and to evaluate tag signal distortion.
PVA microphone hardware, audio processing and compression
on the PVA and the back end will limit the usable frequency
range and will distort a tagging signal.
A. Recording Constraints
Before we investigate tagging performance we evaluate the
general audio recording capabilities of the Google Home Mini.
We speak the phrase “Hey Google, when is your birthday?”.
Then we use the developer mode of the Google Chrome
browser to download the audio recording from Google’s My-
activity website. All voice commands are recorded by the back
end and can be accessed using the aforementioned method.
The recording obtained from the back end is an MP3
encoded file. However, it is not visible to us at which point
this MP3 compression is carried out. It is also not clear if
the audio recording is transcoded along its processing path.
The Google Home Mini may transmit to the back end using
another audio encoding. Also, the back end may internally use
a different format. The conversion into MP3 may happen only
on the download path to the user. However, it is reasonable to
assume that the back end also uses MP3 as the internal storage
format of recordings.
We use the software Audacity to evaluate the MP3 recording
and find it to be a stereo, 16kHz MP3 format. The audio signal
passes through a low-pass filter which attenuates frequency
elements higher than 8 kHz. Due to practical non-ideal low-
pass filters, the attenuation will also affect frequencies just
below 8 kHz.
B. Audible Tag Constraints
We consider an audible tag as described in Section IV. Such
a tag is audible when it is added, and it should not occupy the
frequency range that the spectra of voice signals mainly reside
in (up to 3.4 kHz). Thus, tag extraction can be performed
simply by a band pass.
Figure 2a shows the spectrogram of the spoken command.
The wake word “Hey Google” is clearly visible from 0.5s to
1.2s, and the command “When is your birthday?” is visible
from 1.5s to 2.6s. The spectrogram indicates that most of the
speech energy resides, as expected, below 3kHz. As a voice
signal has its main frequency components below 4kHz, the tag
signal should reside above this frequency (see [8]).
C. Test Tag
We create a simple audible test tag to evaluate tagging
performance. A tag should reside between 4kHz and 8kHz
to fit with both recording and tag constraints. It is our aim
to see how a tag in this frequency range is affected by the
recording process.
We create a frequency vector with the value of the elements
set to zero except bins representing 5kHz to 7kHz (with a
Fig. 3: Experiment Setup.
1kHz interval), 7.1kHz to 8kHz (with 100Hz interval), and
9kHz to 12kHz (with 1kHz interval). Then we use Inverse
Fast Fourier transform (IFFT) to generate the time domain
tag signal. Figure 2b shows the spectrogram of this tag signal.
Note that the upper limit of the frequency axis is around 22kHz
as the sampling frequency of the signal is set to 44.1kHz.
We use this signal shape to clearly see how the tag signal is
attenuated close to the 8kHz boundary defined by the recording
constraints.
D. Tagging Performance
We use a long tag signal (about 5 seconds) for testing. We
start emitting the test signal from a speaker and then activate
the Google Home Mini with the wake word “Hey Google”
followed by the question “When is your birthday?”.
Figure 2a shows the spectogram of the spoken command.
Figure 2b shows the tag signal. Figure 2c shows the spec-
trogram of the recording retrieved from the back-end system.
Figure 2d shows the audio signal with the overlaid tag signal
below 8kHz for comparison.
It can be seen that the tag information above 7.2kHz is
lost. The sampling frequency of the audio encoding is 16kHz,
which means ideally all of the audio contents below 8kHz
should be retained. However, only the audio contents below
7.2kHz remains, and we assume this may result from the
unavoidable imperfection of the filter design.
Comparing the result in Figure 2c and the ideal condition
in Figure 2d, it can also be seen that tag lines have widened
due to signal recording and processing steps. These distortions
would have to be considered within the tag design to ensure
correct information retrieval.
VII. A PROTOTYPE TAGGING SYSTEM
An audible tag as evaluated earlier should not be present
continuously, since otherwise it would be perceived as noise
nuisance. It is necessary to emit the tag signal only briefly
and when required. In this section we describe and evaluate a
tagging device which we design to perform this task. This is
a proof-of-concept prototype, demonstrating the feasibility of
building a practical tag device.
A. Tagging Device
As the hardware platform we select a Raspberry Pi 3 Model
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Fig. 4: The spectrogram of the downloaded signal resulting from the
prototype tagging system
We chose this platform as it provides prototyping flexibility
while it is comparable in functionality to other platforms such
as mobile phones that might be chosen to implement a tagging
device.
The tagging device is required to emit the tag signal only
when required. We use the same wake word that a potentially
present PVA uses to tag transmission. We implement the
wake word detection using PocketSphinx [1]. PocketSphinx
is an optimization of CMU’s SPHINX (an open source Large
Vocabulary Continuous Speech Recognition Systems (LVCSR)
system) for resource-limited embedded systems [9], [10].
PocketSphinx uses the more traditional GMM-HMM approach
for wake word detection while current commercial PVAs such
as Amazon Echo or Google Home use proprietary algorithms
(For example, DNN-HMM in case of Amazon). As the tagging
device uses a different algorithm than the PVA, it is possible
that one device recognizes a key word while the other does
not. However, in our experiments we did not observe this case
of differing wake word detection results.
A simple Python script was used to detect the wake word
and transmit a predefined audible tag.
B. Evaluation
To evaluate the tagging device we use the experiment setup
shown in Fig 3. A Google Home Mini is used as the PVA and
the tagging device with speaker and microphone are placed
next to it.
We use the tag signal as described in Section VI. The
tag signal duration is set to one second. We then speak the
sentence “Hey Google, when is your birthday?” to test the
system. The wake word is recognized by the PVA and as well
as the tagging device which emits the tag signal. Thereafter we
use Google's Myactivity website to download the recording.
Figure 4 is the spectrogram of the audio file representing the
whole experiment. “Hey Google” ends at around 1.2s after the
start of the recording. A series of horizontal lines representing
the tag signal which starts at 2.4s and lasts for 1s. Figure
4 suggests that it takes around 1.4s for the reactive tagging
device to successfully recognize the wake word “Hey Google”
and to start transmitting the tag signal.
Figure 4 also reveals how Google Home Mini handles its
wake word recognition. The recording stored in the back end
begins before the wake word is spoken. We can assume that the
Google Home Mini continuously records sound, regardless of
the presence of the wake word. Conversation fragments spoken
before a keyword may be recorded by the back end.
C. Discussions
Our prototype demonstrates the feasibility of the tagging ap-
proach. For example, this approach can now be used to signal
recording dissent (see application example in Section III). A
user who does not wish to be recorded can activate the tagging
device. The tag will be embedded when the PVA is triggered
and the back end may discard the recording on tag detection.
The tagging prototype is relatively slow and the tag signal is
emitted after 1.4s. Software optimization would significantly
reduce this time and allow us to place the tag signal between
the wake word “Hey Google” and the command “When is
your birthday?”. This would provide a better user experience
as the audible tag sound would fall in the quiet gap instead of
overlapping with the command.
We did not plan for multiple tagging devices in this scenario;
in this case a tagging protocol as sketched in Section V would
be required. We also did not evaluate more complex tagging
options as outlined in Section IV.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The design of Personal Voice Assistants (PVAs), together
with the underlying Speech Recognition (SR) technology, is
an active research area. We have briefly discussed some recent
SR research trends in Section VII-A. Here we review related
work on PVA security and privacy.
One line of work investigates attacks on PVA hardware.
Researchers have looked at injecting commands covertly into
the system by utilizing the non-linearity of PVA micro-
phones [2]. Roy et al. improve this method and extend the
attack range [11].
Another research strand investigates attacks on SR algo-
rithms. Kumar et al. investigated the interpretation errors made
by Amazon Echo, and used these errors to trigger malicious
applications [12]. Their attack was improved later by Zhang
et al. [13]. Other attacks aimed to mislead an SR to recognize
words as something completely different to what human ears
perceive [7], [14]. These attacks targeted Kaldi [15], a state-
of-the-art SR engine which allegedly is built in commercial
products such as Amazon Echo.
Existing work has proposed a machine learning model to
detect whether the voice is coming from a human rather than
a playback device [16] to defend against playback attacks. Roy
et al. also developed a trace-detecting defense against ultra-
sound attacks exploiting non-linearity of microphones [11].
Recent work by Cheng et al. [9] has shown that reactively
jamming wake words can prevent a PVA from processing
commands. Our work in this paper also relies on wake word
recognition to trigger an audio signal. However, the purpose
is to tag a recording instead of directly disabling the entire
processing chain. Chandrasekaran et al. [17] use a constant
jamming signal to prevent PVA audio processing. Continuous
jamming is inefficient and may cause health hazards. Recent
work by Champion et al. [6] proposed to control the audio
signal reaching the PVA via a preceding microphone with a
filter. However, their approach requires to modify the PVA
hardware.
IX. CONCLUSION
People generally object to conversations being recorded
without consent and given the widespread use of PVAs it is
necessary to provide better recording control than currently
available. In this paper we have shown that acoustic tagging
is a viable option to signal to PVAs and their back-end systems
how recordings should be handled. We have explored the
design space of acoustic tagging in the PVA context and
described the implementation and evaluation of an initial
prototype. In next steps we aim to develop a full system, and
to explore its performance and usability in a realistic setting.
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